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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the causes of business cycle fluctuations that Japan experienced over the period 
1980  to  2000.  To  this  end,  I  build  a  dynamic  general  equilibrium  model  with  endogenous  borrowing 
constraints where business cycle fluctuations are the result of TFP fluctuations and investment frictions. I 
identify land tax changes since 1984 as a possible source of investment frictions, the idea being that given a 
strong preference for debt-financing and widespread use of land as collateral in Japan, land tax changes will 
cause fluctuations in land price that can potentially affect output and investment by affecting borrowing 
capacity of firms. Calibrating the model using Japanese data and feeding in observed TFP and land taxes 
one by one and in unison, I find that TFP and land tax fluctuations can significantly account for observed 
fluctuations in output, but cannot account for land price fluctuations unless agents expect land tax changes 
to be permanent. I further identify redistribution of land holding between commercial and residential uses 
in response to land tax and TFP changes as an important channel through which the effect of these external 
fluctuations  on  output  gets  amplified.  Observed  data  of  land  use  in  Japan  provides  evidence  of  such 
redistribution. 
Key words:  Japanese economy, Business cycle fluctuations, land price fluctuations, borrowing constraints, 
debt-financing, collateral, redistribution, financial accelerator, expectations, amplification 
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1  Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to build a standard growth model with efficiency and investment frictions to 
numerically account for the business cycle fluctuations witnessed in Japan over the period 1984 to 2000. 
This paper builds on my previous paper
1 that shows that to have a model that significantly accounts for 
business  cycle  fluctuations,  we  need  to  incorporate  efficiency  and investment  frictions.  The  efficiency 
friction that I model is fluctuations in Solow residual. As for investment frictions, I model fluctuations in 
land prices as a potential source of investment friction. I further use efficiency and land tax fluctuations as a 
catalyst for land price fluctuations. The idea is that given the preference for debt financing by Japanese 
firms and widespread use of land as collateral, fluctuations in land price significantly amplify the effect of 
external fluctuations on output. This paper seeks a quantitative answer to the specific question ￿ To what 
extent can fluctuations in TFP and land taxes account for business cycle fluctuations in Japan given the 
presence  of  endogenous  borrowing  constraints  in  the  economy￿.  Using  a dynamic general  equilibrium 
model  with  time  varying  efficiency  and  land  taxes,  I  find  that  fluctuations  in TFP  and land  taxes  can 
significantly  account  for  fluctuations  in  output.  Land  taxes  alone  successfully  account  for  40%  of  the 
fluctuations. As for land price fluctuations, TFP and land tax fluctuations cannot significantly account for 
them unless agents expect these external changes to be permanent. 
 
This paper is based on a vast array of literature on endogenous borrowing constraints.  The seminal papers 
in this area are by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1995) who pointed out how the 
dynamic  interaction  between  endogenous  credit  limits  and  asset  prices  turn  out  to  be  a  powerful 
transmission mechanism by which effect of shocks persist, amplify and spill over to the real economy. As 
                                                 
 
1 ￿Business Cycle Accounting: Application to Japanese data for the period 1984 to 2000￿ University of 
Minnesota Mimeo 2004 
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for the reasons of Japanese economic fluctuations, there are two diametrically opposing strands of literature. 
Authors  like  Kashyap  and  Hoshi  (2003)  have  held  low  profitability  of  the  banking  sector  and  non-
performing loans responsible for the economic slowdown. Other authors like Prescott and Hayashi (2004) 
on the other hand, blame the economic fluctuations on fluctuations of Solow residual and attribute no role 
to investment frictions. 
 
 I  develop  a  standard  stochastic  growth  model  with  both  efficiency  and  investment  frictions  where 
efficiency frictions are modeled as fluctuations in Solow residuals. Investment frictions on the other hand 
result from land price fluctuations whose effect on output gets amplified in the presence of endogenous 
borrowing constraints that entrepreneurs in this model need to satisfy to get funds for investment. I use land 
as an input for production as well as for residential purposes. Land is also used as a collateral to secure 
loans. As a catalyst for land price fluctuations, I look at land tax fluctuations, which was suggested by 
Alpanda (2004) who found that changes in land-holding taxes can significantly account for the increase of 
land value relative to GDP in the eighties and the fall in the early nineties but only if the changes were 
expected to be highly persistent. There are also other views about the boom and bust of land prices. Ito 
(1992) and Kobayashi (2004) have done studies of various possible causes of the boom and bust of land 
and asset prices in Japan. These authors have primarily stressed the role played by people￿s expectations 
about persistence of land prices to explain the boom and bust of land prices in the last two decades. In my 
experiments, I further test if expectations play a significant role in accounting for fluctuations in land prices. 
A key feature of the Japanese tax system that drives the model is that the government allows firms to 
deduct interest payment on debt from taxable corporate income thus creating a tax shelter for firms. This 
incentive encourages debt financing, as internally generated funds cannot be claimed as deductible from 
corporate income tax. 
 
The arguments of this paper assume that collateral constraints are important for the Japanese economy. The 
empirical question of whether collateral constraints are important in the Japanese corporate sector has been 
studied by many authors including Kashyap, Hubbard and Whited (1993), Bayoumi (2000), Ogawa et. al   5 
(1994). Bayoumi uses a VAR to investigate four possible explanations of the extended slump in Japanese 
economic activity over the 1990s: the absence of bold and consistent fiscal stimulus, the limited room for 
expansionary monetary policy due to liquidity trap, over investment and debt overhang and disruption of 
fiscal intermediation. He finds that ￿the major explanation is disruption in financial intermediation, largely 
operating through the impact of changes in domestic asset prices on bank lending￿. 
 
I calibrate the model to match the moments from Japanese data during 1980-1984. Working through the 
dynamics  of  the  model,  I  find  that  fluctuations  in  TFP  and  land  taxes  can  significantly  account  for 
fluctuations in GDP per capita and the effect is greatly amplified in presence of endogenous borrowing 
constraints.  Fluctuations in land taxes alone account for 30% of the increase and 50% of the subsequent 
drop in real GDP per capita. However, fluctuations in land taxes and TFP cannot significantly account for 
fluctuations  in land  price  if  agents  do not  expect  them to  be  permanent.   This  finding  gets us  to  the 
questions, if land prices do not change significantly, what causes the model to replicate the type of business 
cycle fluctuations that Japan experienced? My answer: redistribution of land holding between commercial 
and residential uses in response to changes in TFP and land taxes.   
 
How does the redistribution mechanism work?   Entrepreneurs value land as an input as well as collateral 
asset. Also the statutory tax rate on land holding of entrepreneurs is three times the tax rate on land holding 
of workers, so the entrepreneurs￿ decision on how much land to hold is very sensitive to fluctuations in land 
taxes.  Hence  any  change  in  the  land  taxes  leads  to  a  redistribution  of  land  between  workers  and 
entrepreneurs. Since in this model, only entrepreneurial land is used for production, any fluctuation in land 
holding of entrepreneur affects output. Given that entrepreneurs derive their income from selling the output 
produced, fluctuations in output have an impact on entrepreneurs￿ investment in land and capital for future. 
Given  that  when  borrowing  constraints  are  endogenous,  the  borrowing  limit  is  a  fraction  of  the 
entrepreneurial wealth which comprises of capital and land holding of the entrepreneur, fluctuations in 
entrepreneurial  investment has a  direct impact  on how  much  the  entrepreneur  can  borrow  which  then   6 
affects future production. So, any change in land taxation policy, working through redistribution of land 
amplifies the economy￿s response to changes in land taxes.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I provide some facts about the Japanese economy before 
and during the downturn in 1990s. In Section 3, I explain the model- a dynamic general equilibrium model 
with perfect competition and borrowing constraint. In Section 4, I state the model propositions. Section 5 
describes the calibration and solution procedure. Section 6 describes the results. In Section 7, I present 
some sensitivity analysis of changing expectations about persistence of shocks. Further, I show numerically 
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2  Overview of the Japanese economy (1980 to 2000) 
2.1   Land prices in Japan 
Land is a very valuable asset in Japan. It is valued highly both by the corporate sector and the household 
sector. Not only is land used for production and real estate investment, the corporate sector in Japan puts up 
land as collateral when borrowing from banks for investment funding. During the 1980s, the government of 
Japan  started  the  process  of  liberalization  of  the  economy  and  allowed  foreign  investors  to  invest  in 
Japanese firms. As direct foreign lending became a major form of financing for the big firms, the domestic 
lenders like banks and postal savings institutions were left with a large supply of funds. In order to invest 
the  excess  funds,  banks  started  lending  to  the  small  firms,  which  typically  offered  land  as  collateral.  
During this period, the government also encouraged real estate investment and resorted to reduce taxes on 
land in an effort to motivate people to invest in real estate. All these factors led to a sharp rise in price of 
land. Between 1980 and 1990, price of land in Japan increased by 89% with respect to a long-term trend as 
figure 1 demonstrates.  
Worried by this dramatic increase the government undertook a series of measures to control for the prices. 
Some of the more noticeable ones implemented by 1990 were a policy to restrict bank￿s lending for real 
estate purposes and a significant increase in taxes on land holding. By 1991, land prices started falling, and 
by 2000, land prices had fallen below what it was in 1980.  
2.2  Share of land held by the corporate sector in Japan 
I assume that total land holding in the economy is one. Traditionally, Japanese firms own substantial land 
holding. As depicted in figure 2, the average share of land held by corporate sector during the period 1980 
to 1984 stood at 27%. During the boom period of late eighties, share of land held by the corporate sector 
increased by 13.4%. However, during the lost decade, share of land held by the corporate sector fell by 
15.2%. Corporate sector land holding has comprised a significant portion of total collateral offered to banks 
to secure loans. 
The period of 1984 to 2000 was also marked by significant fluctuations in the real economy. 
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2.3   Per capita output  
Japanese economy had stabilized after the oil price shock and was growing at a rate of 2.15%.  However, a 
host of measures enacted in later eighties resulted in another economic boom. As is evident from figure 3, 
Japanese economy performed very well during 1984 to about 1991, the average growth rate of per capita 
GDP was 1.39% above trend. The boom was short-lived and economy started stagnating since 1991. The 
average growth rate of per capita GDP fell to 1% below trend level during 1991 to 2000. 
2.4   Capital-output ratio  
Figure 4 plots the capital output ratio over the period 1980 to 2000. The average capital output ratio stood 
at 2.42 from 1980 to 1991. However, since 1991 significant capital deepening has occurred. By 2000, 
capital output ratio increased to 3.1. 
In  this  paper,  I  use a  model  with  possible  external  sources  of  frictions  to  replicate the  above  facts.  I 
concentrate on two possible frictions: TFP fluctuations and changes in land taxation policy over the late 
eighties and early nineties. 
2.5   Fluctuations in TFP 
I begin by estimating Solow residual from the data. Figure 5 depicts TFP after taking out along term trend 
of 2.15%. Between 1980 and 1991, TFP grew over and above the trend growth rate. However the trend 
changed after 1991 and by 2000, TFP had fallen below its 1980 level. 
2.6   Land tax system in Japan 
The land tax system in Japan is a complicated one
2. The standard statutory tax rate in Japan is 3.1%, which 
with a maximum of 3.8%. The agricultural land holdings and the residential land holdings are charged a 
lower statutory tax rate about 1/3
rd of the corporate sector tax rate. However, the tax is not assessed on the 
market value of land, rather on a certain percentage of the official value of land. In Japan, the Land Tax 
Agency has the job of determining the official value of land. They usually look at past three-year averages 
to arrive at the official land value. Typically, the official land value is 70% to 80% of the market value of 
land. The government then decides on an assessment value of land for taxation purposes. The assessment 
                                                 
 
2 The source is the book ￿The Japanese Tax System￿ Hiromitsu Ishi. Details of the tax system are available 
in Appendix 2   9 
value of land is a certain fraction of the official value of land. In 1980, it was about 70% of the official land 
value but by 1990, it had declined to about 36.3% of the official land value. For analyzing the effect of land 
taxes, it is therefore important to look at the effective land tax rate instead of the statutory tax rate. 
 Effective land tax rate = (Statutory tax rate* Assessment ratio*Official land value)/Market Value 
Figure 6 shows us the effective land tax rate of the corporate sector from 1972 till 1997. I have assumed 
that the tax rates did not change thereafter. The effective land tax rate has been pretty stable from 1972 to 
about 1984. However, since 1985, it started to decline and was falling till about 1990. In the meantime, in 
1989, in an effort to increase the land taxes, legislation was enacted to increase the assessment ratio. The 
policy was implemented in 1990 and since then land holding taxes have been on the rise.  
 
3   The model  
I use a standard stochastic growth model with time varying productivity and land taxes. In my model 
borrowers  face  a  credit  constraint.  I  consider  exogenous  as  well  as  endogenous  credit  constraints and 
compute the numerical results in each case. A comparison of these results shows quantitatively the extent 
of amplification caused by endogenous credit constraints. 
Description of the economy 
The model economy every period consists of a measure  t N  of agents, 
w
t N of them are workers and the 
remaining 
e w
t t t N N N   are  entrepreneurs.  I  assume  that  a  person  is  born  either  a  worker  or  an 
entrepreneur  and  the  fraction  of  workers  to  entrepreneurs  is  constant  over  time.  This  is  not  a  very 
unrealistic assumption given the fact that in Japan, family businesses (keiretsu) dominate and it is relatively 
more difficult for potential entrants to become entrepreneurs if they are not a part of a well-established 
business family. I assume that population grows at a constant rate of . The economy is endowed with 1 
unit of land resource held by workers and entrepreneurs.  Workers are endowed with 1 unit of labor and 
entrepreneurs are also endowed with 1 unit of labor. The labor of the entrepreneur is distinct from the labor 
of the workers. We can think of entrepreneurs to have managerial or administrative skills as distinct from 
workers  who  may  provide  the  physical  labor.  There  is  one  good  being  produced  and  consumed.  The   10
production technology for producing the good is owned by the entrepreneurs. Production requires capital, 
labor of workers, labor of entrepreneurs as well as land as input into the production process. The production 
technology is given by    , , ,
t z wd e e
t t t t t y e F k h h l  where  t z  is the productivity parameter. There is a 
government that sets the tax rates, spends on final goods and disburses transfers to the consumers. I shall 
assume  that  government  expenditure  is  wasteful  and  does  not  increase  utility  of  the  population. 
Government  balances  budget  every  period.  In  working  out  the  dynamics  of  the  model,  I  assume  that 
government spending is a constant fraction of output. Further, the share of each group of consumers in total 
transfers does not change over time. For notational convenience, I am using all capital letters to indicate 
aggregate variables and small letters to indicate per capita variables. 
Representative worker￿s problem 
 The representative worker begins every period t with  t a units of savings and 
w
t l  units of land held from 
the previous period t-1. He is also endowed with 1 unit of labor. During the period t, he has to decide the 
fraction of time 
w
t h  he wants to work at the given wage rate  t w  and amount of final good 
w
t c  he wants to 
consume to maximize the present discounted value of his lifetime utility. If he supplies 
w
t h  units of labor, 
he earns after tax wage income,    1
w
t t h wh   . He earns after tax interest income   1 (1 ) t b t r a    on 
his  savings  from  the  last  period,  t-1.  The  worker  also  receives  transfers 
w
t T  every  period  from  the 
government. The worker spends part of his income for buying consumption good.  I further assume that the 
worker values land for residential purposes so every period he also invests in land to be used the next 
period. I denote worker￿s investment in land by    1
w w
t t t q l l   where the market price of land in period t is 
denoted by t q . In addition, every period the government also charges the worker some tax on the value of 
his land holdings 
w
t t q l . The amount of tax due on land holding of the worker is
w w
t t lt q l  , where 
w
lt   is the 
effective tax rate on land holding.  Any remaining income is saved for future. 
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Thus the representative consumer￿s problem can be stated as: 




( ,1 , )
:
1. ( ) (1 ) (1 (1 ))
2. 0; 0; 0 1; 0;
w w w
t t t
t w w w w
t t t c h l
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t t t t t t lt t t t h t b t w
w w
t t t t
Max E u c h l
subject to
c q l l q l a w h r a T t









          
     

 
Representative Entrepreneur￿s problem 
The representative entrepreneur begins every period t with 
e
t l  units of land,  t k  units of capital stock and 
t b  units of borrowed funds from the previous period t-1. He also owns the production technology and is 
endowed with 1 unit of labor. In period t, the entrepreneur decides what fraction of time 
e
t h  he would work 
and how many units 
e
t c  of output he would consume to maximize present discounted value of lifetime 
utility. He also decides how much labor 
wd
t h to hire for production. In addition, he supplies 
e
t l  units of land 
and  t k  units of capital for production. The production technology uses land, capital, labor of worker and 
labor of entrepreneur to produce output,  t y .  
With the income received from sale of output, the entrepreneur pays the workers labor income
wd
t t w h . His 
repayment on loans with interest is   1 t t r b  . He also has to pay a corporate tax on taxable corporate 
income. He can claim the wage income paid to workers, the depreciation of capital stock and the interest 
part of repayment of funds as deductible. We shall assume that the depreciation rate of capital stock is a 
constant,  . So, the corporate income tax paid is ( )
w
y t t t t t t y wh rb k      . The entrepreneur receives 
transfers 
e
t T  every period from the government.  With the remaining income, the entrepreneur finances 
consumption;  invests  in  land,    1
e e
t t t q l l    and  invests  in  capital  stock,  t x  for  future.    Just  like  the 
workers, the entrepreneur also has to pay a tax on land holding, 
e e
t t lt ql  , the tax rate 
e
lt   being greater than 
w
lt  . In this model, the fact that the entrepreneur can claim interest payment as a deductible from taxable   12
corporate income provides an incentive to the entrepreneur to finance production through borrowed funds. 
So every period the entrepreneur borrows funds  1 t b   for future investment. However, he cannot borrow 
unlimited funds. The entrepreneur faces a limit to how much he can borrow. In the model with exogenous 
borrowing constraint, the borrowing limit 
1 t B
  is independent of the wealth holding of the entrepreneur. As 
opposed  to  this,  in  a  model  with  endogenous  borrowing  constraint,  borrowing  limit 
1 t B
  is  a  certain 
fraction,   of the value of his wealth holding,   1 1
e
t t t k ql    . 
Thus the representative entrepreneur￿s problem can be stated as: 
 








1. ( ) (1 (1 ))
( )
2. (1 )
3. , , ,
4.
e e e wd
t t t t t
t
t e e e
t t c x l h h
t
e e e wd e e
t t t t t t t t t lt t b t
wd e
t y t t t t t t t t
t t t
z wd e e
t t t t t
t
Max E u c h
subject to
c x q l l w h q l r b
y y w h k rb b T t
x k k t
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I assume that government balances its budget every period, so that 
    ( )
w w w w e w e e
t t t h t t b t t lt t t t y t t t t t t lt t t G T N w h ra q l N y w h k rb q l t                  
where  t G  is aggregate government expenditure and 
t T  is aggregate transfer. I shall further assume that 
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Every period the resource constraints are satisfied so that labor, goods and land and savings market clears: 
1
( (1 ) ) 1
e w
t t t t
e e w w
t t t t t
e wd w w
N h N h t t t t
e e w w N l N l t t t t
N b N a
e e w w e e
N c N c N k k G N y t t t t t t t t t t





      
 
 
Notice that if there are no wedges, i.e. we set the time varying TFP to a constant value and assume no time 
varying taxes on land holding then the economy would be on a balanced growth path. I assume that on a 
balanced growth path output and investment per capita grow at a constant rate z g .  However, if there were 
shocks to either the TFP, or tax on land holding, then the output would diverge from the balanced growth 
path output.  
Definition of recursive equilibrium in this model
3 
I  denote  the  vector  of  state  variables  of  representative  worker is  denoted  by   
9 , , ,
w w s s l S R      and 
representative  entrepreneur  by   
10 , , , ,
e e s s l k S R     ,  where 
4 S R   be  the  vector  of  aggregate  state 
variables. For a detailed description of the states, please refer to Appendix 2. 
A Recursive Competitive equilibrium for this model comprises of value function of worker,  ( )
w w v s  and 
value  function  of  entrepreneur,  ( )
e e v s ;  price  functions  ( ), ( ), ( ) w S r S q S ;  policy  functions  denoting 
worker￿s  consumption,  labor  supply,  ( ), ( )
w w w w c s h s ;  policy  functions  denoting  entrepreneur￿s 
                                                 
 
3 Details of the state space are specified in Appendix 2   14
consumption, labor demand, entrepreneur￿s labor supply and output,  ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )
e e e e wd e e c s h s h s y s ; laws of 
motion of entrepreneur￿s borrowing, entrepreneur￿s stock of land and capital,  ( ), ( ), ( )
e e e e b s l s k s ; laws of 
motion  of  worker￿s  saving  and  stock  of  land,  ( ), ( )
w w w a s l s  and  aggregates: 
( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )
w e K S L S L S S S B S such that:   
 
Given price functions and predetermined state variables, policy functions and laws of motion solve the  
(a)  Representative worker￿s problem: 
   
, , ' , ' ( ) max ( , ,1 ) ( ' )
. .
' ' (1 ) 1 (1 )
w w w
w w w w w w w w
c h l a
w w w w w w w
l h b
v s u c l h Ev s
st





         
 
 
(b)  Representative entrepreneur￿s problem: 
       
, , , ' , ' ( ) max ( ,1 ) ( ' )
. .
' 1 ' 1 '
' '
( , , , )
e wd e e
e e e e e e e
c h h l b
e e e e e wd wd e
l y
z e e wd
v s u c h Ev s
st
c k k q l l ql wh r b y y wh rb k b T
b B
y e F k l h h
nonnegativity satisfied

   
  




(c)  Resource constraints satisfied 
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4            Model propositions 
There exists no analytical solution to the model. However, we can derive some propositions along the 
balanced growth path. 
Proposition  1  On  a  balanced  growth  path,  an  increase in  value  of  land  holding tax  on  corporations 
decrease the value of land held by corporations relative to GDP and vice versa. 
Value of land held by corporations with respect to GDP is given by: 
 
1

















            

















-in a model with exogenous borrowing constraint. 
The formula can be derived from the Necessary first order conditions
4. The formula shows a negative 
relation between share of corporate land in output and land holding tax. 
Proposition 2 Borrowing Constraint binds with equality if and only if the tax rate on earned income of 
workers is strictly less than the corporate income tax rate
5. 
Intuition:  In  Japan,  government  has  tried  to  encourage  savings  by  households  and  debt  financing  by 
corporations. It has allowed the corporations to claim the interest paid on borrowings as a deductible from 
                                                 
 
4 See Appendix 1 for the derivation of the formula 
5 Proof of the proposition provided in Appendix 1   16
their  corporate  income  tax  base.  No  such  deduction  is  allowed  for  equity  financing.  This  tax  shelter 
promoted debt financing over equity financing as a cheaper alternative as long as the tax paid on interest 
income by the lenders, in our model the workers, is less than the corporate income tax rate. This is true in 
Japan where the corporate income tax rate borders around 49.5% but the tax on interest income is around 
35% as explained in the previous section.  
Proposition 3 In a model with endogenous borrowing constraint, on a balanced growth path, an increase 
in value of land holding tax on corporations decrease borrowings of corporations relative to GDP and vice 
versa. 
Borrowing of corporations with respect to GDP is given by: 
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          
 
 
The formula can be derived from the Necessary first order conditions and Proposition 2. As we can see 
from the formula, tax on land holdings affect the value of land held by corporate sector relative to output 
inversely. It does not affect the capital output ratio. Proposition 2 shows that on a balanced growth path 
borrowing constraint hold with equality. So, borrowing to output ratio is a constant fraction of the sum of 
capital output ratio and value of land holding in the corporate sector to output ratio. Hence, any decline in 
value of corporate land holding to output as a result of increases in land holding tax results in a decline in 
borrowing to output ratio.   17
 
5  Solution procedure and calibration   
5.1   Solution procedure 
In proposition 2, I show that the borrowing constraint holds with equality in the steady state. I assume that 
the same is true in the neighborhood of the steady state and use the Method of Log Linearization around 
steady  state  suggested  by  King,  Plosser  and  Rebelo  (1988)  to  solve  the  non-linear  model.  The 
computational tool used is the Blanchard-Kahn Algorithm. I have assumed population growth in my model, 
so I have to adjust the problem of the representative worker and representative entrepreneur accordingly.  
Notice that in the model, in the absence of distortionary wedges, the economy would be on a balanced 
growth path with output per capita, consumption per capita, investment per capita all growing at the rate z g , 
land price  t q  would rise at the rate   1 z g   , land held by both workers and entrepreneurs would fall at 
the rate   and labor would be constant over time. Further, in case of exogenous borrowing constraints, we 
need exogenous borrowing constraint to grow at the rate   1 z g    on a balanced growth path.  So, to 
solve for a steady state for the model, I need to discount all variables on the balanced growth path by their 
growth rate on the balanced growth path. The first step is to calibrate the model to estimate the parameters. 
I calibrate the model to match the moments from the Japanese data taking averages over 1980 to 1984. The 
next step is to find the steady state values of the variables around which we will log-linearize the model. I 
shall choose the initial condition for the variables such that in the starting year, one that I choose to be 1980, 
the economy would be on a balanced growth path, at its observed initial value for consumption, investment, 
government consumption, output and land value. I can then log-linearize the model around the steady state 




                                                 
 
6 The details are available in appendix 1.   18
 
5.2   Calibration 
To calibrate the model, I shall first have to specify the functional form used for utility function of worker 
and entrepreneur and the production function. 
Let 
1 2 ( ,1 , ) log log(1 ) log
w w w w w w w
t t t t t t u c h l c h l         
1 ( ,1 ) log log(1 )
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The main source of my data is the Hayashi and Prescott (2002) data set and Japan Statistical Yearbook. For 
data  on  land  values,  I  have  used  Alpanda  (2004)  dataset,  which  is  derived  from  the  Japan  Statistical 
Yearbooks. 
5.3  Interpretations of data used: 
The aggregate consumption in my model is the sum of the aggregate consumption of the workers and the 
entrepreneurs.  To  match  the  model  to  the  national  income  accounts,  I  have  added  net  exports  to   19
consumption to arrive at aggregate consumption. I have also subtracted Net Indirect Business Taxes from 
consumption. Therefore Aggregate consumption, 
w w e e
t t t t N c N c    = Private consumption + Net Exports-Net 
Indirect Business Taxes; 
I have added government investment to data on private sector investment to get aggregate investment. 
Investment  is  the  sum  of  Gross  Fixed  Capital  formation  and  Net  change  in  inventories.  Therefore, 
Aggregate Investment,  t X = Private Investment + Government Investment; 
Output,  t Y = Aggregate Consumption + Aggregate Investment + Government Consumption. This data is 
identical to GDP minus Net Indirect Business Taxes. 
To get the aggregate value of land held by the entrepreneurs, I have added the aggregate value of land held 
by the corporate sector and the aggregate value of land held by the agricultural sector. We have data for the 
aggregate land under cultivation from Japan Statistical Yearbook. However, there is an issue if the use of 
agricultural land is for agricultural purposes only or the farmers use part of it for residential purposes. Here 
I  assume  that  half  of  the  agricultural  land  is  for  cultivation  and  the  other  half  is  used  for  residential 
purposes. The data on aggregate value of land holding provides the aggregate value of land holding in the 
corporate  sector  and  the  aggregate  value  of  land  holding  in  the  non  corporate  sector  which  includes 
agricultural land. Therefore we need to adjust the data on corporate land holding to also account for the 
agricultural land to get aggregate value of land held by entrepreneurs; 
Aggregate  Capital  Stock  held  by  entrepreneurs,  t K =  Aggregate  capital  stock  in  the  economy,  which 
includes private as well as government capital. I assume that government capital is used for production 
purposes.  






: I take the ratio to be 12% in accordance with the 
population census of Statistical Bureau. My measure of entrepreneurs is the self-employed and the total 
working population consists of all adults aged 20 to 69. I shall calibrate the model so to match the data for 
the Japanese economy for 1980-1984 averages.    20
Share of transfer going to the worker: There is no data for this parameter. One of the reasons that I use 
transfers in my model is to avoid any income effect of change in taxes on hours worked in comparison of 
steady states. The share parameter value that ensures this is .86. 
The model is calibrated to match the moments of the data as stated under the National Income Accounting 
and Balance Sheet concepts. To get the long run population growth rate  , I take the averages for 1980-
1984 of the working population. I define working population as population aged 20 to 69. The average 
growth rate of working population is .81%. I consider the long run growth rate of the per capita variables 
  1 z g  to be 1.215%, which is the average growth rate of GDP per working population for 1980 to 1984.  
We also need to state the tax parameters used for calibration. The tax on labor income  h   is 33%. The tax 
on interest income  earned  by  workers  b   is  35%. The  corporate income  tax rate  y   is  assumed to  be 
49.5%. I hold these taxes constant for the entire period 1980 to 1984. The average tax rate on land holding 
on corporate sector 
e
l   is 1.67% and about .56% for the non-corporate sector land tax rate 
w
l  during 1980-
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Table 1  National income accounting 
National Income Concepts (with respect to output)  NIA 
Data 
Model Adjustments 
National  Income  Concepts  (with 
respect to output adjusted for Net 
IBT) 
Product Side of National Accounts     
Consumption  .691  .679  (Private  Consumption  +Net 
Exports -Net IBT) 
 Private  .592  .58 
 Government  .099  .099 
Investment  .299  .32    (Private  +  Government 
Investment)  
 Private  .241  .32 
 Government  .057  0 
Net Exports  .010  0 
Total  1  1 
Income side of national accounts     
Compensation of employees  .55  .59  
Operating Surplus  .25  .27 
Depreciation of Capital  .13  .14 
Indirect Business Taxes net of subsidies  .06  0 
Total   .99  1 
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 Next, we need to summarize the Balance sheet concept that has been used for calibration. I am using four 
stock variables: value of capital at the beginning of the year, value of land held by the corporate sector, 
value of land held by the non-corporate sector (which includes government) and value of aggregate loans. 
 
Table 2  Balance sheet 
Balance Sheet Concepts 
(with respect to output) 
NIA Data  Model  Adjustments  (with respect 
to output adjusted for Net IBT) 
  Output adjusted for Net IBT  Output adjusted for Net IBT 
Capital  2.446  2.446 
Private  2.146  2.446 (private + government) 
      Government  .3  0 
Land value  3.63  3.63 
Corporate  .91  .933(adjusted for agricultural land 
used for production) 
Non  corporate  (including 
government) 
2.72  2.694(adjusted  for  agricultural 
land used for residential purposes) 
Borrowing  2.2  2.2 
 
I further assume interest rate to be 4.8% from Hayashi-Prescott data set. Using the above data and the 
steady  state  equations  we  can  estimate  the  parameter  values. Given  the  capital-output  ratio  and  the 
investment-output ratio, we get delta to be .1002. It is slightly lower than the data because w cannot match 
all  three  (capital-output ratio,  investment-output ratio  and  depreciation)  from  the  Necessary  first  order 
condition. We need to take estimates of two from the data and estimate the third from the model. The 
measure of land value in corporate sector to output and borrowing to output ratio gives us the collateral   23
constraint parameter  equal to .66.  Interest rate data gives us  of .99. I shall assume that the share of 
workers in total output is given by compensation of employees to output ratio and is equal to .59. We 
derive the preference parameters and shares of capital, land and entrepreneur from the first order conditions.  
Summarizing all our parameters estimated by matching the moments of the data, we get
7: 
 
Table 3  Calibration 
1    2         
k    l    h      
1.96  .0471  .99  .1  .37  .03  .59  .66 
 
Stochastic process  
Before I can solve the model, I need to state the evolution of TFP and Land Holding Taxes in my model. I 
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We use SUR estimation procedure to estimate the parameters of the stochastic process, 
.51; .91
w e
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7 The details are worked out in Appendix 1   24
6   Results 
The purpose of this paper is to quantitatively account for fluctuations in per capita output and land prices 
using fluctuations in TFP and land taxes. To this end, I have calibrated the model to match the moments 
from data for the period 1980 to 1984 and solved the model for the decision variables. In this section, I feed 
the TFP and land tax wedges one by one and in unison in the model to assess the fraction of economic 
fluctuations accounted for by these wedges.  
Before stating the results, it may be worthwhile to compare the steady state results of land-holding tax and 
TFP shock in a model without borrowing constraint with a model where borrowing constraint binds to see 
the amplification effect of a borrowing constraint. I shall compare the steady state values of output per 
working population, y, share of land held by corporate sector, 
e l  and land prices q. We have two sources of 
shocks in the model, the TFP and the Land Holding Tax on workers and entrepreneurs. Data tells us that 
between 1980 and 1991, land-holding taxes on the corporate sector fell from 1.67% to .9%. Land holding 
taxes on the non-corporate sector, which was about 1/3
rd of the tax levied on the corporate sector, fell 
from .56% to .3%.  Given the data and calibrated parameters we can estimate sequence of TFP shocks from 
the production function. I set the TFP at 1980 to be one. Between 1980 and 1991, TFP fell from 1 to 1.005.  
6.1   Amplification effect of shocks (steady state comparison) 
Table 4   Land tax shock 
  y  e l  
q   
Endogenous Borrowing Constraint  1.01% increase   29.27% increase  84.12% increase  
Exogenous Borrowing Constraint   .34% increase  5.66% increase  67.6% increase 
 
In a model with exogenous borrowing constraints, a fall in land holding tax has very small impact on output. 
The effect on land holding is comparatively more but the most impact is definitely on land prices. If we 
compare this with a model where we have endogenous borrowing constraint, the amplification effect is   25
striking. Output increase is three times as much and land holding by corporate sector increases four times. 
The land price increase is also amplified. 
However, if we have a TFP shock, the amplification effect is not there. 
Table 5  TFP shock 
  y  e l  
q   
Endogenous Borrowing Constraint  .8% increase   0%  .8% increase  
Exogenous Borrowing Constraint   .83% increase  0%  .83% increase 
 
The result shows no amplification of TFP shock. In fact at a first glance, the result seems counter-intuitive 
as we get some amplification, albeit very small, in a model with exogenous constraint. This is however not 
very surprising given that the borrowing limit in a model with exogenous borrowing constraint depends on 
productivity shock. 
The above result leads us to conclude that the amplification effect is significant in case of a shock land tax. 
This leads us to believe that any shock to the land holding tax would have had an amplified effect on real 
variables in an economy where borrowing constraints are binding. So, the performance of the real economy 
could be the result of changes in land tax policy that had an amplified effect on the real economy through 
land prices. We also identify two transmission mechanisms through which the amplification works-the 
change in price of land, also called financial accelerator mechanism and the redistribution of land holding 
for commercial and residential investment, that I term redistribution mechanism.  
6.2   Result of feeding wedges in the model 
This section quantitatively estimates to what extent land taxes and TFP can account for land prices and the 
real economic aggregates.   
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6.2.1  Accounting for economic aggregates feeding TFP and land tax fluctuations in the model 
We begin the analysis by allowing both land taxes and TFP to fluctuate. 
Figure 7 shows the estimated per capita output as a result of feeding TFP and land taxes in the model. Data 
reflects an increase in per capita GDP by 9.3% between 1980 and 1991 followed by a 15.5% drop by 2000 
with respect to the long-term trend. Model result shows 14.7% increase in detrended output per capita 
between 1980 and 1991 followed by a 27% fall by 2000. So, the model overestimates the fluctuation in 
output  per  working  population.  The  question  that  remains  is  how  well  can  the  model  account  for 
fluctuations in land price now that we allow both TFP and land taxes to fluctuate? The answer is not very 
promising. As figure 8 shows, we find that between 1980 and 1991, land prices had increased by 101% 
only to again fall by 51% till 2000. However, the model result shows an increase of 1.7% and a fall of 4.3%, 
which is insignificant, compared to fluctuations in the data.  
With respect to other economic aggregates, the model can estimate the capital-output ratio till 1991 pretty 
well and though it shows some capital deepening after 1991 but it falls short of the extent to which capital-
output ratio changed in the data, as depicted by figure 9. The model overestimates the fluctuations in land 
held by corporate sector shown in figure 10. 
We next analyze the results by feeding the wedges one by one in the model. 
6.2.2  Accounting for economic aggregates feeding only land tax fluctuations in the model 
Figure 11 shows the estimation of output per capita of inserting only land tax wedge, holding TFP constant 
at 1980 level. In data, output per working population increases by 9.3% from 1980 to 1991 and fall by 
15.5% by 2000. Feeding land tax wedges alone in the model, per capita output increases by 2.8% and falls 
by 7.8% by 2000. The performance is not so good in accounting for change in prices. In data, land price, 
after adjusting for the long-term trend, increases by 101% from 1980 to 1990. It starts falling in 1991 and 
by 2000 decreases by 51%. In model, as shown in figure 12, with land tax wedges alone, land prices 
increase by 1.4% by 1991 and falls by 3.6% with respect to the long-term trend.  
To understand the impact of fluctuations in land holding tax on the real economy, I also look at other real 
economic aggregates. I concentrate on the capital-output ratio and share of land holding of the corporate   27
sector. This is depicted by figure 13. The models perform well in estimating the capital-output ratio till 
1991 when capital-output ratio was pretty constant. However, the models with only land tax wedge fail to 
capture much of the subsequent capital deepening, though they show an increasing trend in capital-output 
ratio. The models perform well in estimating share of land held by corporate sector, which is what figure 14 
show. 
In the previous analysis, the results clearly show that land tax fluctuations in Japan had significant impact 
on the real economic variables, though the models fall short in explaining any significant fluctuations in 
land  prices.  The  dynamics  also  point  out  that  the  amplification  is  the  result  of  redistribution  of  land 
between workers and entrepreneurs and not the result of financial accelerator at work as land prices hardly 
change. 
 In the above analysis, I held TFP constant at 1980 level but that is not true in the data where TFP fluctuates 
over time.  In the next subsection, I show how well a model with endogenous borrowing constraint can 
account for fluctuations in real economic variables and land prices given fluctuations in Land Taxes as well 
as TFP. 
6.2.3  Accounting for economic aggregates feeding only TFP fluctuations in the model 
Figure 15 shows the estimation of output per capita of inserting only TFP wedge, holding land tax constant 
at 1980 level. In data, output per working population increases by 9.3% from 1980 to 1991 and fall by 
15.5% by 2000. Feeding TFP wedges alone in the model, per capita output increases by 12.3% and falls by 
22.8% by 2000. The performance is not so good in accounting for change in prices. In data, land price, after 
adjusting for the long-term trend, increases by 101% from 1980 to 1990. It starts falling in 1991 and by 
2000 decreases by 51%. In model, as shown in figure 16, with land tax wedges alone, land prices increase 
by 1.1% by 1991 and falls by 2.5% with respect to the long-term trend. The model does not estimate capital 
output ratio very well as shown in figure 17, the performance is better in estimating share of land held by 
corporate sector. This is what figure 18 depicts. 
6.2.4  Summary of results 
The results point in two main directions. TFP and land tax fluctuations can well replicate the performance 
of real economic aggregates, though they do not perform well in replication land price fluctuations. Results   28
further suggest the redistribution of land holding between corporate and non corporate sector in response to 
external fluctuations are a major channel through which impact of external fluctuations on real economic 
aggregates get amplified.  
In the next section, I perform some sensitivity tests to see the robustness of my model. 
7  Sensitivity analysis  
I perform sensitivity tests in two directions: how well do the fluctuations in TFP and land taxes account for 
the  fluctuations  in  per  capita  output  and  land  prices  when  agents￿  expect  the  external  changes  to  be 
permanent?  Further,  can  we  really  observe  significant  amplification  when  borrowing  constraints  are 
endogenous as opposed to exogenous as theory suggests? 
7.1  Experiment 1:   Results assuming presence of unit roots 
In  the  previous  section,  I  presented  results  assuming  that  shocks  follow  a  stochastic  process  where  I 
estimated the persistence parameter from data. We found that even though TFP and land tax fluctuations 
performed reasonably well in accounting for real economic aggregates, they failed to significantly account 
for changes in land prices. Would the results change if the agents perceive the shocks to be more persistent? 
In this section, I check the results assuming the shocks are permanent. I further provide the results when 
borrowing  constraints  are  exogenous  to  numerically  show  the  extent  to  which  effects  of  external 
fluctuations on economic aggregates get amplified in presence of endogenous borrowing constraints. 
 
7.1.1   Test for presence of unit roots in stochastic process 
Can we rule out the presence of unit roots in TFP and land tax data? To motivate use of unit root, I provide 
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Table 6  Presence of unit root in time series for TFP 
Null Hypothesis: z has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -1.188   0.8668 
Test critical values  10% level    -3.39   
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. 
 
Table 7  Presence of unit root in time series for land taxes 
Null Hypothesis: TAUL has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -2.26   0.4207 
Test critical values  10% level    -3.39   
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. 
 
The  above  results  indicate  that  we  cannot  reject  the  null  hypothesis  of  presence  of  unit  roots  in  our 
stochastic processes. In the following section, I shall therefore provide results assuming unit roots. Given 
that I allow  for the  presence  of  unit roots  in  the  stochastic  processes,  I need  to  perform a  test  for  co 
integration of TFP and Land holding tax. I use the Johansen Cointegration test.  
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Table 8  Cointegration test for cointegration of TFP and land taxes 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test 
Hypothesized    Trace  5 Percent  1 Percent 
No. of CE(s)  Eigenvalue  Statistic  Critical Value  Critical Value 
None   0.575783   24.39203   25.32   30.45 
At most 1   0.347068   8.099361   12.25   16.26 
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level 
 Trace test indicates no co integration at both 5% and 1% levels 
 
7.1.2  Result allowing only land tax fluctuations assuming unit root  
Given  agents￿  expect  changes  to  be  permanent,  model  with  an  endogenous  borrowing  constraint 
significantly over estimates the impact of a land tax shock as is evident from figure 19. This result is not 
very  unexpected  given  financial  accelerator  at  work  as  when  agents  believe  land  tax  changes  to  be 
permanent, there is significant impact of land tax changes on land price. Figure 20 shows the estimation of 
land prices by inserting only land tax wedge, holding TFP constant at 1980 level. If economic agents expect 
changes in land tax to be permanent, then the model performs much better in accounting for fluctuations in 
land value. We have observed in data land price, after adjusting for the long-term trend, increases by 101% 
from 1980 to 1990. It starts falling in 1991 and by 2000 decreases by 51%. A model with endogenous 
borrowing constraint shows a 22.3% increase in land prices and a subsequent fall by 42.9%.  
However, we are also interested in performance of other aggregates. As figure 21 suggests, the model also 
performs well in accounting for the capital output ratio. Is there evidence of redistribution of land holding 
in  this  case?  We  find  similar pattern  of  over  estimation of  land  tax  shock  when  we  look  at  share  of 
corporate landholding as figure 22 depicts, however overestimation is not as much as in case of output.  
 
   31
7.1.3  Result allowing only TFP fluctuations assuming unit root  
As observed in the pervious case, the impact of TFP shock is much amplified when agents expect these 
changes to be permanent. The impact of TFP shock on per capita output is much amplified as shown in 
figure 23. As far as the question of estimation of land price is concerned, as figure 24 depicts, observed in 
data land price, after adjusting for the long-term trend, increases by 101% from 1980 to 1990. It starts 
falling in 1991 and by 2000 decreases by 51%. In the model, the increase in land price is 6.1% and the fall 
is by 11.2%. The model also estimates well the trend in capital output ratio (figure 25) and share of land 
owned by corporate sector (figure 26). 
7.2  Experiment 2:   Amplification due to endogenous borrowing constraints 
The  theory  of  endogenous  borrowing  constraints  as  suggested  by  Bernanke  and  Gertler  (1989)  and 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1995) hinges on the result that effect of external shocks on the economy are greatly 
amplified  in  the  presence  of  endogenous  borrowing  constraints.  Intuitively,  when  borrowing limit is  a 
function of agents￿ wealth, any fluctuation in wealth affects borrowing capacity, which impedes future 
production and investment. This is not the case when borrowing limit is not dependant on agents￿ wealth. 
Can we numerically prove this assertion? 
Here I provide results of feeding fluctuations in land tax in two types of models: one with endogenous 
borrowing constraints, where borrowing limit is a function of agents￿ wealth holding; the second one with 
exogenous borrowing constraint, where borrowing limit does not depend on individual wealth holdings. 
7.2.1  Result allowing only land tax fluctuations  
As figure 27 depicts, with respect to long term trend, per capita output increases by 1.62% from 1980 to 
1991 and falls by 4.5% by 2000 in a model with exogenous borrowing constraint, as opposed to an increase 
of 2.8% from 1980 to 1991 and a fall by 7.8% by 2000 when borrowing constraints are endogenously 
determined. As far as land price is concerned, we cannot discern much of amplification as we see in figure 
28. This is due to the fact that when agents￿ do not expect external changes to be permanent, land taxes 
hardly have any impact on land price, so there is no observed variation even when we have endogenous 
borrowing constraint. 
Does that mean the amplification is greater if agents￿ expect external changes to be permanent?   32
 
7.2.2  Result allowing only land tax fluctuations assuming unit root  
When we assume unit root for the stochastic process of land taxes, in a model with endogenous borrowing 
constraint, per capita output increases by 25% between 1980 and 1991 and falls by 48% from 1991 to 2000. 
This can be compared to an increase by 2% by 1991 and a fall by 6% by 2000 as generated in a model 
where borrowing constraint is exogenous as figure 29 highlights.  In this case, we even see amplification of 
the impact of land taxes on land prices. %. A model with endogenous borrowing constraint shows a 22.3% 
increase in land prices and a subsequent fall by 42.9%. A model with exogenous borrowing constraint 
shows a .62% increase in land prices and a subsequent fall by 15.9%.  This is depicted in figure 30. 
8   Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to build a standard growth model with efficiency and investment frictions to 
numerically account for the business cycle fluctuations witnessed in Japan over the period 1984 to 2000. I 
used  a  standard  growth  model  with  time-varying  TFP  and  land  taxes  to  model  the  efficiency  and 
investment frictions in Japanese economy. The key idea of using land taxes as a catalyst of investment 
friction was that given penchant for debt financing of investment and widespread use of land as collateral, 
any  external  fluctuation  that affects  value  of  land  can have  a  significant  impact  on the real  value,  by 
affecting borrowing capacity of firms. 
Calibrating the model to match the moments of Japanese data for the period 1980 to 1984 and then feeding 
in the frictions one at a time and in unison, I find that changes in land taxation alone can explain about 40% 
of the fluctuations in real economic aggregates. However, it fails to significantly account for fluctuations in 
land prices. Fluctuations in TFP alone can very well account for per capita output but not land prices. The 
model overestimates the fluctuations in real economic aggregates if we allow both TFP and land holding 
taxes to fluctuate, but the model￿ s performance in accounting for changes in land prices does not improve. 
The model suggests that redistribution of land holding between corporate and household secotr play an 
important  role  in  channeling  the  external  fluctuations  to  have  an  amplified  impact  on  real  economic 
aggregates. I further find that the performance of the model is very sensitive to agent￿s expectations about 
persistence of shocks. If agents expect the changes in TFP and land holding taxes to be permanent, given   33
fluctuations in TFP and land holding taxes, the model can account for half of the initial increase in land 
prices  and  almost  the  entire  decline  in  land  prices  in  the  nineties.  The  drawback  is  that  the  model 
significantly overestimates the fluctuations in real economic aggregates. Unit root tests show that it is not 
unreasonable to assume persistence, as we cannot rule out presence of unit roots in stochastic process for 
land taxes and TFP. This paper also studies quantitatively the amplification effect of an endogenous credit 
constraint. The quantitative results of impact of changes in land taxation support the theory that in presence 
of endogenous constraint, effect of a shock on real economic aggregates gets amplified.  
Given our analysis, we may conclude that the ￿Lost Decade￿ of economic growth in Japan was not a big 
puzzle.  A  standard  growth  model  with  time  varying  TFP  and  land  taxes,  as  used  in  this  paper,  can 
significantly account for fluctuations in real economy. The bigger puzzle that remains yet unexplained is 
the boom and bust of land prices.  
It  would  be  interesting  for  future  research  to  concentrate  on  causes  that  can  account  for  the  huge 
fluctuations in land prices, is it due to economic fundamentals, or is it just a bubble? If we can well account 
for land price fluctuations, then we hope that the penchant for debt financing and wide spread use of land as 
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Figure 1   Land price with respect to a long-term trend 
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Figure 4   Capital output ratio 
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Figure 7   Per capita output with respect to long-term trend allowing for TFP & land tax fluctuations 































Figure 8   Land price with respect to long-term trend allowing for TFP & land tax fluctuations  
(---- data; -----model)   38
 
 



















Figure 9   Capital output ratio allowing for TFP & land tax fluctuations 
(---- data; -----model) 
 
 


















Figure 10   Share of total land under corporate ownership allowing for TFP & land tax fluctuations 
 (---- data; -----model) 
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Figure 11   Per capita output with respect to long-term trend allowing only land tax fluctuations  






























Figure 12   Land price with respect to long-term trend allowing only land tax fluctuations  
(---- data; -----model) 
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Figure 13   Capital output ratio allowing only land tax fluctuations 
 (---- data; -----model) 
 
 

















Figure 14   Share of total land under corporate ownership allowing only land tax fluctuations 
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Figure 15   Per capita output with respect to long-term trend allowing only TFP fluctuations  
































Figure 16  Land price with respect to long-term trend allowing only TFP fluctuations  
(---- data; -----model)   42



















Figure 17   Capital output ratio trend allowing only TFP fluctuations  






















Figure 18   Share of total land under corporate ownership allowing only TFP fluctuations 
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Figure 19   Per capita output with respect to long-term trend allowing only land tax fluctuations  































Figure 20   Land price with respect to long-term trend allowing only land tax fluctuations  
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Figure 21   Capital output ratio allowing only land tax fluctuations  
(---- data; -----model) 

















Figure 22   Share of land owned by the corporate sector allowing only land tax fluctuations  
(---- data; -----model) 
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Figure 23   Per capita output with respect to long-term trend allowing only TFP fluctuations  
































Figure 24   Land price with respect to long-term trend allowing only TFP fluctuations  
(---- data; -----model) 
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Figure 25   Capital output ratio allowing only TFP fluctuations  
(---- data; -----model) 
 

















Figure 26   Share of land owned by the corporate sector allowing only TFP fluctuations  
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Experiment 2:      Amplification resulting from endogenous borrowing constraint 





























Figure 27   Per capita output with respect to long-term trend allowing only land tax fluctuations  






























Figure 28   Land price with respect to long-term trend allowing only land tax fluctuations  
(---- data; -----model-bendog.; -----model-bexog) 
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Experiment 2:      Amplification resulting from endogenous borrowing constraint 































Figure 29   Per capita output with respect to long-term trend allowing only land tax fluctuations  































Figure 30   Land price with respect to long-term trend allowing only land tax fluctuations  
(---- data; -----model-bendog.; -----model-bexog)   49
APPENDIX 1  PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS & STEADY STATE EQUATIONS 
Lagrangian for Households: 
Let us first write the Lagrange with the detrended variables. In this appendix all the variables have been 
appropriately detrended. 
 
   





[log log 1 log log 1 log ]
1 1 1






h t t b t t w
t t w w w w w w
t t z t t t t lt t t
c h l t g t
L E N w h r a








       
 
                                          
  
Lagrangian for Entrepreneurs:  
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Necessary Conditions for entrepreneurs: 
e
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- In a model with exogenous borrowing constraint 
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- In a model with endogenous borrowing constraint 
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- In a model with exogenous borrowing constraint 
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In a steady state: 
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If corporate tax rate  y  is greater than the tax rate on interest earnings of workers,  b  , then  >0, as 
e  >0, 
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Steady state equations for estimating parameter values 
 



































































      
                    
    
    
    




















































   
        
     
     
   
  
   











   54
APPENDIX 2  NOTES 
The Japanese Tax System-An Overview 
The Japanese Tax system is very complicated. Taxes are charged at three levels: National, Municipal and 
Local.  In this segment, I shall provide an overview of the different types of taxes that are used in the model 
and for calibration. I also explain how I calculate the taxes used. For a detailed analysis of the tax system, a 
good source is the book ￿Japanese Tax System￿ by Ishi.  
The broad categories of taxes are taxes on individuals and taxes on the corporate sector. 
Taxes on individuals   
 Tax rate on interest earnings on bonds 
I consider the interest from fixed-term deposits and bonds, dividends of profits from jointly administered 
investment trusts and bond investment trusts. Under the Maruyu system of taxation, the interest on bonds 
can be taxed by two alternative methods. Under the first alternative, the interest income is charged at a rate 
of 20 % withholding at source, but it cannot be exempted from calculation of taxable income. The second 
method of taxation is optional separate withholding taxation at source (35% withholding at source), and it 
can be exempted from calculation of income taxation. I am assuming the second alternative and I take the 
tax on interest earnings on bonds to be 35%. 
 Tax rate on wage income 
All taxable income in excess of the minimum taxable level is subject to tax at progressive income tax rate. 
National income tax rate starts at 10% for income up to 2 million yen, and it rises to 37% for income above 
18 million yen. By contrast, the local income tax rates consisting both municipal income tax rate and 
prefecture tax rates are simple. The prefecture income tax rate is 2% on the first 7 million yen and 3% 
above it. The standard rate of municipal tax rate begins at 3% and rises to 10% for the income above 7 
million yen. 
I shall consider the middle-income tier of annual income of 7-9 million yen and I consider the tax rate 
charged to this group: National tax rate of 20% + Prefecture income tax rate of 3% + Municipal income tax 
rate of 10% =33% tax rate on individual income.   55
 
 Tax rate on consumption  
For tax charged on consumption, I calculate the net indirect tax.   
Net Indirect Tax  = (Indirect business taxes-Subsidies). 
The average for 1955-2000 is 15%. 
I adjust consumption on the expenditure side of NIA by deducting the Net Indirect Taxes. I also adjust the 
GDP from Income side to factor out the Net Indirect tax. 
 
Tax on Corporate Sector 
 Tax rate on corporate income 
Corporate income is taxed on all levels of government in Japan. Before 1990, the national corporate tax 
entailed a two-tier system where separate tax rates applied to corporate retained earnings and income paid 
out as dividends. The lower tax burden on dividends was intended to encourage dividend payments and 
higher rates of equity financing, however was deemed ineffective and was phased out during 1989-90. 
Within the context of the 1988 tax reform, the tax rate on retentions was lowered from 42% to 37.5% and 
the tax rate on dividends was increased from 32% to 37.5% by 1990. 
The  local  taxes  on  corporate  income  are  the  prefecture  and  the  municipal  inhabitant￿s  taxes  and  the 
prefecture enterprise tax. The inhabitants￿ taxes on corporate income are levied as surtax on the national 
corporate tax, whereby a standard rate of 5% is levied on national corporate tax at the prefecture level and 
another 12.3% is levied at the municipal level neither of which is deductible from the national corporate tax. 
The enterprise tax, however, is deductible and it was levied at a rate of 12% on all corporate income until 
1999 when the rate was lowered to 9.6%. The effective corporate income tax rate was around 55% for 
retained profits and 45% for dividends before the 1988 reform. With the reform, these rates have converged 
to 50% and stayed there until 1998-99 when major reductions in the national corporate tax and enterprise 
tax have reduced the effective corporate income tax rate to 41.5%; very close to its counterparts in the US 
and Europe. I shall consider the average for 1980-1984, which is 49.5%.   56
 Tax on corporate property  
Taxes  on  corporate  land  are  mainly  imposed  at  the  municipality  level.  The  three  major  tax  items  on 
property holdings of corporations are the property tax, city planning tax.  
The property tax is imposed on all tangible assets at a standard rate of 1.4%. The city planning tax is levied 
on land and buildings at a rate of 0.3%. The special land-holding tax is levied on land holdings at a rate of 
1.4% and the land portion of the property tax is deductible for calculations of taxable value. All these taxes 
suggest that the statutory tax rates on corporate land are 3.1%.  However, the effective tax rates for land are 
much lower.  
This is due to the underassessment of land values for tax purposes. In Japan, an official land valuation 
(kouji kakaku) is published every year by the National Land Agency to serve as a tax base for land in 
different regions. In turn, local governments assess land values for taxation purposes as a ratio of this 
benchmark  price  every  three  years. The  local  government  assessments  are  significantly  lower than  the 
official values and have gone even further down in the 80s. The national average for the ratio of assessment 
to official values dropped from 67.4% in 1982 to 36.3% in 1991 [See Ishi (2001)]. Given that the official 
land  values  are  already  around  70%-80%  of  their  market  values,  the  effective  marginal  tax  rate  on 
corporate land was about 1.68% in early 80s. This ratio dropped to 0.9% by 1991 mainly due to the fall in 
local government assessments. In the tax reform of 1991, the assessment ratios were raised to 70% of 
official values and also a new tax on land holdings, the Land Value Tax was introduced at the national level 
starting  from  1992.  This  new  tax  was  levied  at  a  rate  of  0.3%  (0.2%  in  1992)  on  land  holdings  of 
corporations and individuals. Later it was reduced to a rate of 1.5% in 1996-97 as a special relief and was 
suspended altogether by 1998. Ishi (2001) reports that the ratio of assessments to official land values in the 
whole of Japan was 67.4% in 1982, 52.1% in 1985, 47.2% in 1988, and 36.3% in 1991. I use the statutory 
tax rates, an official land price to market price of 80% for all periods and assessment to official value ratios 
reported by Ishi to arrive at an effective marginal tax rate on land holdings. In the big cities, the assessment 
ratios were even lower with only 21.9% in Tokyo area and 14.6% in Osaka-city in 1991. The tax base on 
the individuals is ‰ to … of the tax charged on corporate sector. I assume the tax rate on individuals to be 
1/3
rd the tax rate of the corporate sector. Further, I have accounted for the agricultural sector as a part of the   57
corporate sector in my model. The statutory tax rate of the agricultural sector is 1/3
rd the statutory tax rate 
of the corporate sector. So, in calculating the effective tax rate for the corporate sector in my model, we 
have to be aware of this difference. 
Notes for defining Recursive Competitive Equilibrium for the model. 
Before defining the recursive equilibrium for this model we should note a few things. 
Predetermined state variables for the economy: Aggregate savings, A, Aggregate borrowings, B, Land held 
by  workers, 
w L , Land held by entrepreneurs,
e L . Let 
4 S R   be the vector of aggregate state variables. 
Vector  of  exogenous  state  variables:   
3 , ,
e w
l l z R       Predetermined  state  variable  for  representative 
worker: savings, a, land held, 
w l , and predetermined aggregate and exogenous state variables. The vector 
of  state  variables  of  representative  worker,   
9 , , ,
w w s s l S R     Predetermined  state  variable  for 
representative  entrepreneur:  borrowings,  b,  land  held, 
e l ,  capital  k,  and  predetermined  aggregate  and 
exogenous state variables. The vector of state variables of representative worker,   
10 , , , ,
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